It Is Not Uncommon For An Executive Agreement To Be Made
The expected Paris Agreement does not fit well into these categories. The scale of national regulation needed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions makes the agreement an unlikely candidate for a single executive agreement. Although some commentators have referred to both the UNFCCC and the International Civil Aviation Convention as a possible basis for an agreement between the treaty and the executive, it is likely that these contracts would only achieve measurement and reporting (UNFCCC) or aircraft emissions control (CICA).  Finally, there is no existing or predictable legislation in Congress that explicitly defines the reasons for an executive agreement of Congress. Executive agreements are often used to circumvent the requirements of national constitutions for treaty ratification. Many nations that are republics with written constitutions have constitutional rules on treaty ratification. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe is based on executive agreements. The Case-Zablocki Act of 1972 requires the President to notify the Senate within 60 days of an executive agreement. The president`s powers to conclude such agreements have not been restricted.
The reporting requirement allowed Congress to vote in favor of repealing an executive agreement or to refuse funding for its implementation.  In summary, it is possible to answer the question of whether the President could, constitutionally without the consent of the Senate, conclude the Paris Agreement in the same way as the Minamata Convention, if certain conditions are met. The text of the agreement must link the United States to national reductions in greenhouse gas emissions; The agreement must not exploit the dichotomy of industrialized and developing countries; and Congress cannot enact laws that explicitly suppress its support. If these conditions are met, there could indeed be a strong legal justification, without the Senate signing the United States at the signing of a new global climate agreement in Paris.  See U.S. Senates, Powers – Procedures: Treaties, available at www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm (last time on May 8, 2014) (“The United States is currently a party to nearly nine hundred contracts and more than five thousand executive agreements”). This justification can be divided approximately into three directions: 1) the United States has already taken “significant steps” to comply with treaty obligations; 2) obligations can be implemented within the framework of the “existing legislative and regulatory authority”; 3) The treaty complements national measures by applying to the “transnational character” of the problem. The first prong provides a practical justification – it will not require much effort, a fact that supports the argument of the existing executive. The second proceeding claims an implicit authority that arises from an existing legislative mandate within the meaning of the Clean Air Act. The reason here is that the president can infer congressional authorization to enter into an international agreement in which the delegated authority of Congress authorizes measures that respect its commitments.
The third painting alludes to the president`s foreign policy power. As Hannah Chang, a former colleague of the Sabin Center, said, lawyers have divided these conventional alternatives into three categories: only executive agreements, congressional executive agreements and executive agreements.  It is likely that Congress has already expressed, in the Byrd Hagel resolution of 1997, a limited rejection of certain agreements aimed at reducing greenhouse gas emissions.  This resolution expresses the Senate`s view that the United States should not accept an agreement imposing new commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions by developed countries, unless the agreement also imposes specific new commitments to limit or reduce emissions from developing countries during the same compliance period.